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Case No. 20040955-CA 
Priority Level 2 - Incarcerated 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF (AMENDED) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(2)(e) and UT. R. APP. P. 3(a) provides this Court's 
jurisdiction over this appeal from two Judgments and Orders of Commitment to Utah 
State Prison entered October 18, 2004, in this case involving charges of Burglary, a 
second degree felony; Theft, a second degree felony; Receiving or Transferring a Stolen 
Motor vehicle, a second degree felony; and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
Issue 1; Did the "reasonable doubt" jury instruction presented at trial 
correctly state the law? 
Standard of Review: Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law is 
review able under a correction of error standard, with no particular deference given to the 
trial court's ruling. State v. Reyes. 2004 UT App 8, f 14, 84 P.3d 841, citing State v. 
Archuleta. 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993). Determining the propriety of the 
instructions submitted to the jury presents a question of law, which this Court reviews for 
correctness. Id. at f 15, see, Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468,471 (Utah App. 1993). 
Issue 2; Was defendant's trial counsel ineffective when she failed to move 
for a directed verdict at the end of defendant's trial? 
Standard of Review: Ineffective assistance of counsel claims present a mixed 
question of law and fact; however, where defendant is represented by new counsel on 
appeal and the record is adequate to review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
the court will review these claims as a matter of law. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 
518 (Utah 1994); State v. Chacon, 926 P.2d 48 (Utah 1998). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
L UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDS. V, VI, and XIV. 
n. CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ART. I §§ 7,12. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 23, 2004, Devon Kinne (hereinafter "Kinne") was charged by 
Information in Case No. 0417-14 in the Seventh Judicial District Court with Burglary, a 
second degree felony, and Theft, a second degree felony. Vol. I, pp. 1-21. On January 
27, 2004, Kinne was charged separately by Information in Case No. 0417-12 in the 
Seventh Judicial District Court with Receiving or Transferring Stolen Motor Vehicle, 
Trailer or Semitrailer, a second degree felony; and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a 
class B misdemeanor. Vol. II, pp. 1-2. In an order signed February 2, 2004, the trial 
court appointed Joyce B. Smith to represent Kinne in these two matters. Vol. I, pp. 7-10; 
1
 The record on appeal contains two separate pleadings files on the separate charges in 
this matter. Unfortunately, these were not paginated together, but both begin with page 
1. To avoid confusion, Appellant will cite to the separate records as follows: for the 
charges filed January 23,2005, Appellant will designate the contents as "Vol. I" and for 
the charges filed January 27,2005, Appellant will designate the contents as "Vol. II." 
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Vol. II, pp. 3-6. Shortly thereafter, Rosalie Reilly, entered her substitution of counsel on 
Kinne's behalf. Vol. I, pp. 12-13; Vol. H, pp. 8-9. On September 2,2004, Rosalie Reilly 
filed her motion to withdraw from the matter, which was granted on September 3, 2004. 
Vol. I, pp. 56-57, 65-66; Vol. H, pp. 45-46, 53-54. The trial court then re-appointed 
Joyce Smith to represent Kinne. Id. 
By agreement pripr to trial, the separate charges contained in Case No. 0417-14 
and Case No. 0417-12 were consolidated for purposes of trial. Transcripts ("Tr.") at pp. 
40, 148. On September 16, 2005, the consolidated cases came for jury trial before 
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson of the Seventh Judicial District Court. Tr. at p. 3. At the 
conclusion of the trial, the juiy found Kinne guilty on all charges. Vol. I, pp. 109-110; 
Vol. H, pp. 94-95. 
On October 18, 2004, Kinne came before the trial court for sentencing. Vol. I, 
pp. 133-134; Vol. II, pp. 117-118. Kinne was sentenced to one to fifteen years each on 
the Burglary, Theft and Receiving or Transferring Stolen Motor Vehicle, Trailer or 
Semitrailer, charges, and six months on the Possession of Drug Paraphernalia charge, all 
to be served concurrently. Id. On October 18, 2004, the trial court entered two separate 
Judgement and Order of Commitment (the "Judgements'9) for the separate cases. 
Following trial, Counsel herein was appointed upon Ms. Smith's withdrawal to 
represent Kinne for purposes of this appeal. On November 5, 2004, Kinne timely file his 
Notice of Appeal from the Judgements. Vol. II, pp. 120-121. On May 3, 2005, Kinne 
filed his Opening Brief with the this Court. In July of 2005, the State filed their Motion 
to Stay the Briefing Schedule Pending Supplementation of the Record on Appeal, 
indicating that the record on appeal did not contain the pleadings pertaining to the 
Receiving or Transferring Stolen Motor Vehicle, Trailer or Semitrailer, and the 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia charges. On August 8, 2005, Kinne filed his Motion to 
Correct and Supplement the Record on Appeal and for Leave to Amend Appellant's Brief. 
On August 11, 2005, this Court granted Kinne's motion and set the amended brief to be 
filed within twenty-one (21) days. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In early December of 2003, Mr. David Wilson ("Wilson"), who was the caretaker 
for Mr. Stephen Schultz's ("Schultz") residence, called and reported a burglary at the 
Schultz residence. Tr. at p. 49. Deputy Mike Harris (hereinafter "Deputy Harris") with 
the San Juan County Sheriffs Department was dispatched to the Schultz residence. Id. 
Deputy Harris and Grayson Reid ("Reid"), the chief investigator for the San Juan County 
Sheriff Department gathered evidence and took photographs of the ransacked residence. 
Tr. at pp. 51, 52. Harris and Reid noted that the door frame and door edge were damaged 
at the side entrance to the residence. Tr. at p. 52. Schultz identified several items that 
had been taken from his residence, including a video camera, handgun, two shotguns, 
two rifles, a stereo system, and two CD players. Tr. at p. 60. 
On January 4,2004, San Juan County Sheriffs Department received a call from a 
Julie Rogers (hereinafter "Rogers"), who is the mother of Kinne, indicating that her son 
was at Julie Day's (hereinafter "Day") in LaSal with a vehicle that belonged to Rogers 
and she wanted the vehicle returned. Tr. at p. 64. Deputy Hams lived close to the Day 
residence and was dispatched to investigate the matter. Id. Deputy Harris did not find 
Rogers' vehicle when he arrived but, instead, found a Jeep Wagoneer or a Jeep Cherokee 
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at the Day residence. Tr. at pp. 64-65. Deputy Harris ran a check through dispatch on 
the Jeep and found that it was stolen from the Salt Lake area. Id. 
Deputy Harris was then invited into the Day residence, where he observed Sarah 
Lathrum, Cinda Lathram, and Day. Id. Deputy Harris knocked on a back bedroom door, 
where another individual, Christopher Clark ("Clark"), was sleeping with the door 
locked. Tr. at p. 66. Clark opened the door and Deputy Harris entered the bedroom and 
asked Clark for identification. Id. While Clark was searching his pockets for 
identification, he pulled out some marijuana. Id. Deputy Harris asked Clark who the 
vehicle belonged to and Clark told him that it was his mother's vehicle. Id. Deputy 
Harris arrested Clark and took him to his patrol car. Id. 
Before Deputy Harris re-entered the back bedroom of the residence, Day walked 
out carrying a pistol hooked on her finger, informing Deputy Harris that it was in the 
mattress of the bed where Clark was sleeping. Id. Deputy Harris9 further investigation 
located a key on the floor that operated the stolen Jeep. Id. After discovering the key, 
Deputy Harris again asked Clark who the vehicle belonged to and Clark informed him 
that it was a friend's mother's vehicle and that he and Kinne had borrowed it to come and 
see Kinne's mother. Tr. at p. 67. 
Upon further investigation, Deputy Harris learned that the vehicle Rogers 
reported missing had been towed to a wrecker's yard from roadside in the Salt Lake area. 
Tr. at p. 68. Clark admitted to Deputy Harris upon questioning that there was marijuana 
in the center console of the Jeep, which is were Deputy Harris located a black case of 
some kind which contained the drug. Id. Clark admitted to ownership of the marijuana. 
Tr. at p. 69. Upon further search of the Jeep, Deputy Harris found a set of scales, a 
mirror, a syringe, and a bunch of little baggies. Tr. at p. 71. When questioned, Clark 
indicated that those items were owned by Kinne. Id. 
Several days later at the jail, Deputy Harris again asked Clark who the Jeep 
belonged to and Clark again tells him that the Jeep belonged to a kid's mother. Tr. at p. 
75. However, just prior to Clark's trial he reported to Deputy Harris that the vehicle that 
belonged to Rogers had broken down and that he and Kinne found the Jeep running in the 
driveway, so they jump in and drove to Monticello. Tr. at pp. 75 and 76. Deputy Harris 
also asked Clark about the firearm that was found at the Day residence. Tr. at p. 76. 
Clark told him that Kinne gave it to him to hold for him. Tr. at pp. 76-77. Kinne had 
shown Chirk the gun and stereo and told Clark they were taken from the robbery in 
LaSal. Tr. at p. 77. It is later determined that the serial numbers on the gun found in 
Clark's possession and that stolen from the Schultz residence do not match. Tr. at p. 60. 
On January 23, 2004, Kinne was charged by Information with Burglary, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202, a second degree felony, and Theft in violation 
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404, a second degree felony. Vol. I, pp. 1-2. On January 26, 
2004, Kinne was charged by Information with Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor 
Vehicle, Trailer, or Semi-Trailer in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §41-la-1316, a second 
degree felony, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
58-37a-5(l), a class B misdemeanor. Vol. II, pp. 1-2. 
By agreement prior to trial, the separate charges contained in Case No. 0417-14 
and Case No. 0417-12 were consolidated for purposes of trial. Transcripts ("Tr.") at pp. 
40, 148. On September 16, 2005, the consolidated cases came for jury trial before 
Honorable LyleR. Anderson of the Seventh Judicial District Court. Tr. at p. 3. At the 
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conclusion of the trial, the jury found Kinne guilty on all charges. Vol. I, pp. 109-110; 
Vol. II, pp. 94-95. 
On October 18, 2004, Kinne came before the trial court for sentencing. Vol. I, 
pp. 133-134; Vol. II, pp. 117-118. Kinne was sentenced to one to fifteen years each on 
the Burglary, Theft and Receiving or Transferring Stolen Motor Vehicle, Trailer or 
Semitrailer, charges, and six months on the Possession of Drug Paraphernalia charge, all 
to be served concurrently. Id. On October 18, 2004, the trial court entered two separate 
Judgement and Order of Commitment (the "Judgements") for the separate cases. On 
November 5, 2004, Kinne timely filed his Notice of Appeal from the Judgements. Vol. 
H, pp. 120-121. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court determined in a decision handed down on June 7, 2005, 
that the element of "obviate all reasonable doubt" in a reasonable doubt jury instruction 
carried with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on a degree of 
proof below beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33. f30. With such a 
risk inherent in the use of the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt," a juror may have 
found Kinne guilty under a standard less than that of beyond a reasonable doubt, 
violating Kinne's due process rights under both the UTAH CONSTITUTION and UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION. Although not specifically objected to at trial, this Court 
previously held that the "[exceptional circumstances concept may be employed as basis 
for reaching issues not properly preserved for appeal, where a change in law or the settled 
interpretation of law colors the failure to have raised an issue at trial." State ex. rel. 
T.M.. 2003 UT App. 191, f 16,73 P3d 959. 
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Under Utah law, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, courts 
have consistently followed the United States Supreme Court standard in Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Thus, the defendant is required to show first that his 
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and that said 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment; and 
second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland at 687; State v. 
Kellev. 1 P.3d 546 (Utah App. 2000), quoting Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 521 
(Utah 1994). More recently courts have simplified this analysis by providing that where 
a motion for directed verdict would have been futile, there is no ineffective assistance of 
counsel. State v. O'Brien. WL22862190, 2003 UT App. 419, Utah App., Dec. 9, 2003; 
State v. Whittle. 989 P.2d 52 (Utah 1999). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION 
FAILED TO ACCURATELY STATE THE LAW 
No person accused in the United States may be convicted of a crime unless each 
element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship. 397 
U.S. 358, 362,90 S. Ct. 1068 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (emphasis added), the United States 
Supreme Court has assigned this standard of proof constitutional status, linking it to both 
the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial. Sullivan v. Louisiana. 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993); Winship. 397 U.S. at 362, 364. 
"[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he 
is charged." Winship. 397 U.S. at 364,90 S. Ct. at 1073,25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has recently overturned its holding in State v. 
Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997) setting forth a three-part test for determining 
whether a reasonable doubt jury instruction was improper. State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, 
f 1. The first part of Robertson required the instruction to indicate that the State must 
"obviate all reasonable doubt." The original concept of this prong appeared"...to derive 
from a fear that in ascertaining the conviction of the truth of a charge against a defendant, 
a juror might misapply the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard unless she is required to 
search out, confront, and defeat reasonable doubt with evidence." Reves at f 25. 
The Utah Supreme Court revisited this prong in Reyes and determined to abandon 
it based on the fact that the element of "obviate all reasonable doubt" carried with it the 
substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Reyes at % 30. The Utah Supreme Court undertook the following 
analysis: 
Tf25 The court of appeals found merit in Mr. Reyes's claim that the trial 
court erred when it failed to expressly instruct that the State's proof must 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" as mandated by Robertson. Id. at [^19. 
The "obviate all reasonable doubt" test found life in Justice Stewart's 
dissent in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380-82 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, 
J., dissenting). There, Justice Stewart took issue with an instruction that 
equated "beyond a reasonable doubt" with "an abiding conviction of the 
truth of the charge." Id. He reasoned that since the standard to be applied 
is "beyond a reasonable doubt," it followed that any definition of the 
standard must reference the obstacle-reasonable doubt-to be overcome by 
the evidence, and must convey the principle that the State must surmount 
the obstacle of reasonable doubt to justify a conviction. Id. The "obviate 
all reasonable doubt" concept appears to derive from a feat that in 
ascertaining the conviction of the truth of a charge against a defendant, a 
juror might misapply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard unless she 
is required to search out, confront, and defeat reasonable doubt with 
evidence. 
f26 Insightful and important as Justice Stewart's image of "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" may be, his suggestion that the jury be instructed to 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" is both linguistically opaque and 
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conceptually suspect. Not every jury will confront evidence in its 
deliberations sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. The notion of 
"obviating" doubt is cumbersome at best where proof is scant or lacking in 
credibility. In these instances, a description of "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" that asks jurors to rate the magnitude of their conviction 
concerning the strength of the evidence imparts a more accurate and 
useful concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt" than does a construct that 
requires jurors to identify doubts and assess whether the evidence 
overcomes them. A universal application of the notion that the State must 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" can be achieved only by tying it to the 
concept of the presumption of innocence. If innocence is thought of as an 
array of inchoate reasonable doubts that the State must overcome to attain 
a conviction, it follows that the State must "obviate all reasonable doubt" 
in every case. We do not, however, endorse this unwieldy view of the 
presumption of innocence. 
127 The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard 
is also flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the 
degree of proof necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor 
stamdard. The "obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking: 
the identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the doubt 
against the evidence. This process suggests a back and forth disputation 
of a doubt's merits, all to the end of determining whether the evidence is 
sufficient to "obviate" the doubt. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard does not, however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is 
reasonable on an ability either to articulate the doubt or to state a reason 
for it. An unarticulated conviction that the State has failed to meet its 
burden of proof will serve as a legitimate basis to acquit. 
*8 f28 To the extent that the Robertson "obviate" test would permit the 
State to argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, 
the test works to improperly diminish the State's burden. Writing in the 
Notre Dame Law Review, Professor Steve Sheppard criticized the 
expanding prominence of the requirement that doubts be articulated. 
Steve Sheppard, The Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes 
in the Burden of Proof Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence. 78 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1165 (2003). Professor Sheppard summarized the 
central vice of this trend this way: A troubling conclusion that arises from 
the difficulties of the requirement of articulability is that it hinders the 
juror who has a doubt based on the belief that the totality of the evidence 
is insufficient. Such a doubt lacks the specificity implied in an obligation 
to "give a reason," an obligation that appears focused on the details of the 
arguments. Yet this is precisely the circumstance in which the rhetoric of 
the law, particularly the presumption of innocence and the state burden of 
proof, require acquittal. Tic/at 1213. 
129 Central to our reconsideration of the merits of the "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" element of Robertson is our belief that the exacting 
demands of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard can be clearly and 
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fairly communicated through an affirmative description of the degree of 
conviction that must be attained by a juror based on the evidence. We see 
little to be gained by including within a "beyond a reasonable doubf' 
instruction the potentially confusing concept that every defendant is 
entitled to a presumption of reasonable doubt, which the State's evidence 
must obviate. 
1(30 Because we conclude that "the obviate all reasonable doubt" element 
of Robertson test carries with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to 
find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond a reasonable doubt, we 
expressly abandon it. 
Reyes at H24-30. 
In the instant matter, the "reasonable doubt" jury instruction expressly indicates 
that "[t]he State must eliminate all reasonable doubt," which is substantively the same as 
the prong in Robertson requiring the jury instruction to "obviate all reasonable doubt" 
Vol. I, p. 118; Vol. II, p. 104. As indicated by the Utah Supreme Court, this instruction 
carries with it the substantial risk that a juror found Kinne guilty based on a degree of 
proof below beyond a reasonable doubt. With such a risk inherent in the use of the 
phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt," a juror may have found Kinne guilty under a 
standard less than that of beyond are reasonable doubt, violating Kinne's due process 
rights under both the UTAH CONSTITUTION and UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
While this issue surrounding the reasonable doubt jury instruction was not 
preserved by trial counsel at the trial in this matter, this Court should review the matter 
based upon exceptional circumstances. This Court has previously held that the 
"[exceptional circumstances concept may be employed as basis for reaching issues not 
properly preserved for appeal, where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law 
colors the failure to have raised an issue at trial." State ex. rel. T.M. 2003 UT App 191, 
116, 73 P.3d. 959. The original decision was handed down by this Court in State v. 
Reves on January 15, 2004, upholding the three-part test in Robertson, and the prong 
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requiring the use of the language "obviate all reasonable doubt." 2004 UT App 8, 84 
P.3d 84. Review was granted by the Utah Supreme Court in that matter in May of 2004. 
The trial in the instant matter was held September 16, 2004, while review of Reyes was 
pending. The Opinion by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Reves. abandoning the 
three-part test in Robertson was handed down on June 7,2005. It is clear that this change 
in law, overturning an eight (8) year precedent in Robertson was clearly an unsettled 
interpretation of the law that colored the ability of Kinne's trial counsel to raise the issue 
surrounding the reasonable doubt jury instruction. 
H. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE WHEN 
SHE FAILED TO MOVE FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
Under Utah law, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, courts 
have consistently followed the United States Supreme Court standard in Strickland v. 
Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Thus, the defendant is required to show first that his 
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and that said 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment; and 
second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland at 687; State v. 
Kelley. 1 P.3d 546 (Utah App. 2000), quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 
(Utah 1994). More recently courts have simplified this analysis by providing that where 
a motion for directed verdict would have been futile, there is no ineffective assistance of 
counsel. State v. O'Brien, WL22862190, 2003 UT App. 419, Utah App., Dec. 9, 2003; 
State v. Whittle. 989 P.2d 52 (Utah 1999). 
Utah courts routinely consider motions to dismiss separate and distinct from 
motions for directed verdict. As its name implies, a motion for a directed verdict under 
Rule 50(a) contemplates only jury trials. See, Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 
12 
P.2d 250, 252 (Utah 1985). In the context of a bench trial, the directed verdict's 
procedural counterpart is a motion for involuntary dismissal under UT. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 
See, UTAH R. CIV. P. 41(b), Bair v. Axiom Design. L.L.C.. 20 P.3d 388 (Utah 2001). The 
standard for a directed verdict is that "the court must decide whether the evidence 
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-
sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Wilkins v. Packerware Corp.. 2005 
WL 1528670 (D.Kan.,2005). 
In Howard Industries. Inc. v. U.S.. the court states that the judge determines only 
the law in a jury trial, and conversely, the judge in a non-jury trial is the trier of the facts 
and the law. 126 Ct.Cl. 283, 115 F.Supp. 481. Therefore, when a motion for directed 
verdict is made by a defendant in a jury trial, the judge after considering all the evidence 
must decide if the evidence makes a case on which the law can afford relief. Schad v. 
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.. 136 F.2d 991. This question is solely one of law and 
the findings of the jury involve no "appraisal of the weight or credibility of the evidence 
nor any finding of basic or circumstantial facts. It is merely a formal finding, pursuant to 
the trial judge's instruction, that upon the facts as the plaintiffs evidence shows them to 
be and upon the applicable rules of law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief." Id. In 
Winegar v. Slim Olson. Inc.. the Utah Supreme Court stated that, "[w]hen the trial is 
before a jury, the court cannot weigh the testimony upon a motion for a nonsuit, for the 
reason that it cannot weigh it at any time." 122 Utah 487,252 P.2d 205 (Utah 1953). 
Utah appellate courts have imposed separate standards for granting motions for 
directed verdicts than for motions to dismiss. When determining whether a motion for 
directed verdict should be granted, courts look to whether there is sufficient evidence to 
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give the case to the jury. State v. Jackson, 857 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993V When 
considering a motion to dismiss, the courts consider whether the state has proven all of 
the necessary elements to make a. prima facie case. State v. Milne. 124 P.2d 540 (Utah 
1942). The two motions cannot be substituted for one another based upon these differing 
standards. This Court has previously indicated that it will only substitute a motion to 
dismiss for a motion for directed verdict if the correct standard is applied in the parties' 
argument and the trial court's determination of the matter. State v. Jackson. 857 P.2d 
267,269 (Utah App. 1993). 
A review of Utah case law reveals that many ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims fail because the defendant cannot establish that counsel's deficient performance 
prejudiced them. Utah courts have visited the issue of whether failure to move for 
directed verdict constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Each time where the 
appellate courts have held that failure to make a motion for directed verdict was not 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the court have reason that their ruling is based on the 
fact that the State had undeniably proven its case. However, Mr. Kinne's case is unique; 
it was not obvious that the State had proven its case. 
The State produced only two witnesses at trial, one of which was the investigating 
officer who did not personally observe any of the alleged criminal activity. The other 
witness, who was the more vital witness to the prosecution's case, was unbelievably 
inconsistent and admittedly lied at several stages of Mr. Kinne's criminal proceedings. 
Based on the State's case alone, it was highly likely that the court would have entered a 
directed verdict in Mr. Kinne's favor had his attorney made a proper motion for it. 
14 
The State's first witness was Deputy Harris of the San Juan County SherrifFs 
office. In short, Deputy Harris testified that he investigated a burglary of a residence that 
occurred in December of 2003 wherein a gun was stolen. Tr. 60. Deputy Harris testifies 
that there were no fingerprints to tie Mr. Kinne to the burglary or theft of the gun; 
however a similar looking gun was found in Clark's possession and Clark reported that it 
belonged to Kinne. Tr.60. It is important to note, however, that the serial numbers on 
the guns did not match. Id. Throughout the testimony, it is also established that the 
stolen Jeep was found in Clark's possession in Monticello, Utah. 
The Deputy testifies that Clark told him that the stolen car was his mother's, then 
it was a friend's car, then it was a friend's mother's car. Mr. Clark admitted several days 
later that he was in Salt Lake and said that "we stole a car," later indicating that he and 
Kinne had allegedly stolen the car. Finally, at Kinne's trial Clark testified that it was 
Kinne who stole the car. 
Clark initially stated that he did not know who owned the gun found in his 
possession. Tr. 76. Clark then stated that it probably belonged to the lady of house at 
which he was living. Tr. 76. Deputy Harris then testified that Clark eventually told him 
that "Devon [Kinne] had given him the gun to hold for him." Tr. 76, 77. Deputy Harris 
then testified that Clark told him that he knew that the gun came from the burglarized 
house in La Sal because Kinne had told him that he burglarized it and showed him the 
gun and stereo. Tr. 77. However, later on in the trial, Clark testified that he was with 
Kinne when he allegedly burglarize the home in La Sal and took the gun found in Clark's 
possession, but that he just watched and did not participate2. Tr 111,112. 
2
 Incidentally, Mr. Clark changes this testimony as well, first stating that he waited in the 
car, then that he waited standing outside the house. Tr. 112,115. 
1 * 
hi short, the evidence shows a burglary, theft, and a stolen car occurring with no 
physical evidence indicating that Kinne was involved other than the inconsistent 
statements of Clark who, coincidentally, was found with all of the stolen property in his 
possession. Clearly, Kinne's trial counsel had sufBcient cause to move the trial court for 
a directed verdict. Judge Lyle Anderson himself indicated that it would be unlikely that 
the State would prevail with the evidence they presented, when he expressly stated while 
analyzing the jury instructions that " . . . a conviction . . . [was] a longer shot than I've 
seen in a while." Tr. at p. 148. The prosecution itself even concurred with this 
statement, saying "Me, too." Id. at p. 149. 
At the end of the State's case, trial counsel for Kinne moved the court to dismiss 
the counts against Mr. Kinne on the grounds that the State had not made & prima facie 
case. Tr. at p. 141. Ms. Smith then went on to argue that the charges should be 
dismissed because she " []didn't think they had shown evidence as far as the intent or the 
purpose in any of these counts." Id. The parties and the trial court then undertook an 
analysis of the evidence as it pertained to the elements of each of the four charges. Tr. at 
pp. 141-143. Ms. Smith's entire argument in favor of the motion was as follows: 
Well, I don't think that they have shown evidence as far as 
the intent or the purpose in any of these counts. First of all, 
on the burglary, that there was an intent before entering the 
residence . . . Okay. And then on the theft with the - with 
the purpose of depriving, there hasn't been any evidence 
shown that - that the vehicle was not just being temporarily 
borrowed, that - you know, that it wasn't being returned to 
the owner . . . Okay on the receiving stolen vehicle, there 
has to be the intent to procure the motor vehicle. I don't - 1 
don't think they've shown that, but well, I think they've -
they have tried to put some evidence in on that. And then 
on the paraphernalia on the - they haven't shown any intent 
to use the paraphernalia. 
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1JLLVVI die motion to dismiss based on its 
detennination that the evidence presented did point to each of ih' dcutniK nf the crimes. 
'Ir.at p. 143, MLs. bnuiti lailcd I f^"V flu; court for a directed verdict Even if the court 
determined that trial counsel's motion to dismiss could be construed d !' i tht; smiw ,i\ a 
motion, for directed vVkiia, irmi MUHISC!" - mi linn was deficient in its content thereby 
denying defendant effective assistance of coun^H 
• Trial counsel spent her eniii\ ii"iiMHi iiji'ijiiif that the State failed to meet its 
burden Kxmm" ' didn't establish defendant's intent when she should have been arguing 
that the State failed to meet its burden IX/UIUM JI did in ( sufficiently establish that the 
coin* ;: ; « ;ommitte< :l were linked to defendant. Throughout the entire trial, the State was 
unable to ever establish through reliable witnesses that it was defendant who committed 
thou uimus, 1 hi'i dt-fluent motion prejudiced defendant b> eiim..' * ~~ ?ny opportunity 
for the court;, to enter its own judgment on whether - - * <<< .*y*i 
., I "iln iiicoiisisluil nnd unreliable evidence the Stale mv-d-*.,-.; > j- iu *i»* ^^ 
even acknowledged at the end of the State's C^.L ,\. • n oi a *hoi 
as the juuge h I •. i..i..r lime; this demonstrates a likelihood ihat the court 
believed the State had not met its burden or that it was at kasi ijueshonable whether the 
^
+,?t~ ^ . .
 k\ . l l l m counsel's motion fell below" the reasonable 
standards of professional judgment and said judgment pre;.^«- - % i 
^ ienUiuii ol effective assistance ol counsel when 
she failed to move for directed verdict thereby depriving the cowl u»l vnlvnny \i\ v ,vu 
judgment. In the event that this Court rule,- counsel's motion to dismiss sufficed 
as a IVIMMOM IMI Unfiled Verdict, trial counsel's motion and argument in support ol ilu 
motion was so deficient that it deprived defendant of effective assistance of counsel and 
prejudiced the defendant. 
The State may have presented evidence on the elements of the crimes, but it never 
established that it was Kinne that committed the elements of the alleged crimes. Given 
the trial court's own verbalization of its belief respecting the evidence, there is a high 
likelihood that the trial court would have entertained a motion for a directed verdict, thus 
undermining the determination made by the jury in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Kinne respectfully requests that the Judgements be 
reversed and this case be remanded for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of September, 2005. 
K. ANDREW FITZGERALD 
Attorney for Devon Kinne 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that, on this day of August, 2005, I sent by first-class 
mail, postage-prepaid, two true and correct copies of the above Appellant's Brief 
(Amended) to the following parties: 
Ms. Joanne C. Slotnik 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
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motion was so deficient that il depn\cd dclendatil nl Hledive assistance olVojinsel and 
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RESPfcC XY\\\A\ S l iJ iMi rT l in i ' i " . t,J-l;n " I ' Srptrmber, 2005. 
fe_,^ 
K. ANDREW FITZC3EKALD 
Attorney for Devor 
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Addendum A 
Judgement and < frder of Commitment to Utah State 
Prison, dated October i IS, 2004 
(Burglary and Theft charges) 
SEVhNTH DISTRICT COUR f 
San Juan County 
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 ; ( , 
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 T H E gjgvENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT1 COURT1 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






1 JUDGEMENT AND ORDER 
OF COMMITMENT TO 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
Case No 0417-12 
OCmUKR IK, 2004 
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERS* 
Plaintiff Attorney: Craig C. Halls 
Defendant Attorney: K. Ai 
!!./»' hcine the da> and hour fixed for pronouncing judgment in this case, and the 
defendant being present m court and represented by . m .1 i ..HKI detendjiit having heretofore 
het-n *1 judged guilty of the offense of: 
'COUNT 1: BURGLARY, a Second Degic. - a Second Degree 
Felony, and the defendant stating to the court that there is no legal reason why judgment should 
not be pronounced, the court now pronounces the judgment and s< .. > follows, 
* * ihaiiht deituflaiii r ^ v r w ^ r N N F K> imprisoned in the LT AH STA ' ™*~~ 
term of ONE (1) to. FIFTEEN < TM M \ K > on each count, to be sen -„ - - * 
is to be served conciurently with sentence being served in Case No iMI ' I I li i, muli rnl lit il 
defendant receive credit for time served. 
It is furthered ordered that the defendant pay restitution in the amount oi SX/LL J" 
jointly and severally. 
DATED this '/fyf^X day of October, 2004. 
^Jiyle R. Anderson 
District Court Judge 
WW.44t-^-
.raig C. 
San Juan Cotfnty Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
\t I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ) » da. »-• u . - .•.••• „.. .... ^..... ;-.;. uu, 
or hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGEMENT AND < >RIli K * sf 
COMMITMENT to K. Andrew Fitzgerald, Attorney for the Defendant at 55 East 100 Soutli, 
Moab, IJ'l 84532. Adult Probation Department at 1165 South Highway 191 Suite #3, Moab, IJT 
84.V<>2; and to the Departrrn'M' "' < Vrrections, P.O. Box 250, Draper, UT 84020. 
Addendum ~B~ 
Judgement an, ommitment to Utah State 
Prison, dated October 18, 200 I 
(Receiving and Possession charges) 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Juan County 
F,LED
 OCT 1 8 2004 
•fc-HKQF THE COURT 
DEPUTY 
Br. %r 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL Uli , . . .K. x v. -/>< <-. I 
™ 4.ND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF I TAB 






JLDGEMJWN f AND ORDER 
OF COMMITMENT TO 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
Case No. 0417-14 
HONORABLE L\ Lh R. ANDERSON 
Hulls 
'". Attorney ^ \ndrew Fitzgerald 
T - '* uouncing judgment in this case, and the 
defendant being present v v-ou'* .v~ • ;.-r V- counsel ,MH! delendiml 'Living lirirtmo": 
bee. .^juagc:. ;.. 
COUNT 1: RECEIVING OR TRANSFERRING STOLEN M( )TOR VIT1U 'I ,»• TRAIU 
ShMI I'RAll.l.R ,< So ,mil Di^ur k-loin ,ind COUNT2: POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA, a Class B Misdemeanor, and the defendant stating to the court 
no legal reason why judgment now oronounces the 
judgment and sentence of th<- a>\ ^ follows, te w it. that the delendani, iJFVON KlNNh, In: 
imprisoned in the UTAH STA ' > .*.<.s, : = p ' \ !5)YEARSoxi 
tf* 
Count 1 and SIX (6) MONTHS in the San Juan Count} J.IJI O«M I-HM ' "„ hf M-rved 
concurrently with pi ison viitnicv being served in Case No. 041742. It is ordered that defendant 
receive credit for time served-
DATED tin;- i l.i,. iif i I. I nil i n ? 0 0 4 . 
-1 
L Anderson 
district Court Judge 
^h^I/^i^^ 
anty Allomt^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREF^ CT,K I'lJ- Y that on the jb day of October, 2004,1 mailed, postage prepaid, 
or hand delivered a true and correct ropv of the foregoing JUDGEMENT AND ORDER OF 
COMMITMENT to K Andrew Fitzgerald, Att.-niey for the Defendant at 55 East 100 South, 
Moab, UT 84532; Adult Probation Department at I 16* South Highway 191 Sui'c >H, Moab, UT 
84532; and to the Department of Corrections, P.O. Box 250, Draper. !T T X40?l > 
)lj$Cb~ 
Clerk 
